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LIFE AND LEGAL FICTIONS: REFLECTIONS
ON MARGARET MONTOYA'S MASCARAS,
TRENZAS, Y GRENAS
NATSU TAYLOR

SAITO*

The choice is one that cannot be avoided; because of the social
realities,the very act of writing, done by any person of color,
necessarily becomes either a threat or an appeasement.
-Nancy L. Cook'
Professor Margaret Montoya published Mtiscaras, Trenzas, y
Grefras: Un/Masking the Self While Un/BraidingLatina Stories and Legal Discourse2 in 1994. It was a bold move. There were not many legal
scholars of color in the United States at that time, and probably less than
one hundred Latina/o faculty in tenure track positions.3 Our families and
communities counted on us to succeed, while many of our colleagues
and students presumed we were affirmative action hires and, therefore,
* Professor of Law, Georgia State University College of Law. This essay is based on a
presentation made as part of "Un/Masking Power: The Past, Present, and Future of Marginal
Identities in Legal Academia," a symposium sponsored by the UCLA Chicana/o-Latina/oLaw
Review, April 5, 2013. Special thanks are due the organizers of that symposium and the editorial staff of this journal, especially Daniel Borca, and to professors Margaret Montoya and Mari
Matsuda, whose work inspired this tribute as well as the symposium held simultaneously by
the Asian PacificAmerican Law Journal.WhileI take sole responsibility for the content of this
essay, I would not have had the analytical framework reflected herein, nor the space in which
to express it, without the groundwork laid by so many scholars, including but certainly not
limited to professors Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Paulette Caldwell, Kathleen Cleaver, Ward Churchill,
Richard Delgado, Cheryl I. Harris, Charles Lawrence III, Terry Smith, Jean Stefancic, Rennard
Strickland, Patricia J.Williams, and Robert A. Williams, Jr. I am also indebted to all those who
investigated, documented, and provided legal representation in the cases discussed below, to
Ward Churchill for his support and feedback, and to the Georgia State University College of
Law for its research support.
I Nancy L. Cook, Outside the Tradition:Literatureas Legal Scholarship,63 U. CIN. L. REV.
95, 110 (1994).
2 Margaret E. Montoya, Maiscaras, Trenzas, y Greihas: Un/Masking the Self While Un/
Braiding Latina Stories and Legal Discourse,15 CHICANO-LArNo L. REV. 1 (1994); 17 HARV.
WOMEN'S L.J. 185 (1994).
See Michael A. Olivas, The Education of Latino Lawyers:An Essay on Crop Cultivation,
14 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 117 129-30 (1994) (noting 94 Latina/o law faculty in the United
States proper in 1992-1993, out of some 5700 law teachers).
@ 2014 Natsu Taylor Saito. All rights reserved.
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questionably qualified. As professors Derrick A. Bell, Jr. and Richard
Delgado observed, "[W]e entered our classrooms ... without the pre-

sumption of competence enjoyed by our white colleagues." 4
Having been given the rare opportunity to become not only lawyers
but also law teachers, it was incumbent upon us to be accepted by the
legal academy on its terms-i.e., to assimilate-and to excel according
to its standards.' These standards included producing real legal scholarship, of the 100-page, 400-footnote variety, preferably published in "top
ten" law reviews. 6 Our articles were expected to replicate "traditional"
scholarship, reliant on case law and demonstrating, in Professor Rob Williams' terms, "a strong, well-reasoned, objective, neutral, neutered,'policy-oriented' analysis."7 Narrative was frowned upon or curtly dismissed
as mere storytelling.'
Mdscaras comported with none of these "traditional" standards. It
was not published in a "top ten" law review, but as a groundbreaking
collaboration between two specialized journals. 9 Its focus was not case
law or legal policy, but masks and hair. It addressed the taboo subject
of race-by definition a non-neutral topic, 0 employed autobiographical narrative, criticized the legal academy, and exposed the destruction
wrought by assimilationist policies and aspirations." According to thenprevailing expectations, M6scaras should have faded into obscurity
Instead, we are celebrating the impact this piece and its author have
had on legal scholarship for two decades. It is an honor and a joy to
participate in this symposium honoring Professor Margaret Montoya, as
well as a companion event featuring the work of Professor Mari Matsuda,12 because it allows us to converse with so many scholars and activists
4 Richard Delgado & Derrick Bell, Minority Law Professors' Lives: The BellDelgado Survey, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 349 (1989).
' See generally Robert A. Williams, Jr., Vampires Anonymous and Critical Race Practice,
95 MICH. L. REV. 741 (1997).
6 See id. at 740-750.
7 Id. at 753.
8 The perspective prevalent at the time is reflected in and well summarized by Daniel A.
Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School:An Essay on Legal Narrative,45 STAN.
L. REV. 807 (1993).
Montoya, supra note 2, at 1 n.aa.
10See Williams, supra note 5, at 751; see also PATRICIA J.WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE
AND RIGHTS: DIARY OF A LAw PROFESSOR 47-48 (1991).
" See generally Montoya, supra note 2.
12 "Only We Can Free Ourselves: Reflections on the Works of Mari Matsuda," Symposium
sponsored by the UCLA Asian Pacific American Law Journal, April 6,2013.
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who have broken ground for us, in a space that allows us to consider the
liberatory potential of critical legal scholarship.
It is a space in which we can have a discussion that is -very literally -grounded, beginning with an acknowledgement that this university
campus sits on occupied Tongva land, land that was also illegally taken
from Mexico in 1848.13 1 first heard Margaret Montoya speak publicly at
a critical race theory conference in the 1990s where, in my recollection,
the first words out of her mouth were: "We cannot talk about race in this
country without talking about genocide." With that simple statement,
Professor Montoya created a space in which many of us felt that, finally,
we could breathe freely. Our communities' histories and realities were
not taboo subjects and we could have a real discussion.14 She created a
bridge between our personal and professional lives, enabling us to set
aside, temporarily, the masks we use to protect ourselves when dealing
with mainstream law and "civilization.""
Mdscaras has had such a vital life in legal scholarship and teaching,
and resonates with so many of us, because it creates a similarly liberated zone. Shortly after re-reading M6scaras in anticipation of this symposium, I learned that one of my students, a young black man with a
background in African American Studies, was disheartened by the icy
response he got when attempting to introduce some racial realities into
his criminal law class. Thinking of Professor Montoya's story about the
impact that the Josefina Chivez case had on her,16 I found it a little depressing that M6scaras is, apparently, as relevant today as it was nearly
twenty years ago. Nonetheless, it was a wonderful way to let this student
know that he was not alone and to expose an intersection between his
experiences and those of a Chicana at Harvard forty years earlier. I later
13

On Tongva history and culture, see generally CLAUDIA K. JURMAIN &WILLIAM MCCAW-

0, My ANCESTOR: RECOGNITION AND RENEWAL FOR THE GABRIELINO-TONGVA PEOPLE OF
THE Los ANGELES AREA (2009). On the illegal annexation of northern Mexico, see RODOLFO
AcUNA, OCCUPIED AMERICA: A HISTORY OF CHICANOs 41-55 (4th ed. 1988).
14 Space was also created in which we could be silent without having been silenced, a liberatory experience that is often overlooked. See generally Margaret E. Montoya, Silence and
Silencing: Their Centripetal and Centrifugal Forces in Legal Communication, Pedagogy and
Discourse,5 MICH. J. RACE & L. 847 (2000).
15 On the "persistent and pernicious separation between the personal and professional
lives of the lawyer," law professor and law student, see Melissa Harrison & Margaret Montoya,
Voices/Voces in the Borderlands:A Colloquy on Re/ConstructingIdentities in Re/Constructed
Legal Spaces, 6 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 387, 391 (1996).
16 See Montoya, supra note 2, at 18-22.
LEY,
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learned that he passed the piece along to some of his Latina classmates,
illustrating M6scara'songoing ability to generate shared space.
This essay begins with a few reflections on the powerful imagery Professor Montoya deploys in her discussion of the braiding of hair and, more
generally, the cultural significance we attach to hairstyles.17 I tell these
stories in Section I in the hope of illustrating that by venturing beyond
prescribed boundaries, Professor Montoya has exposed common ground
from which we can begin to assess the intersections of our cultures and our
legal analyses. Section II discusses this intersection more generally, considering the impact that consideration -or exclusion -of cultural and historical context has had on four politically-charged trials. Section III expands
on the backdrop of these cases to demonstrate that the exclusion of lived
realities from legal processes can mask the dangers of assimilation and
the reality that, as Margaret Montoya observed, we cannot discuss race in
this country without acknowledging genocide. Section IV argues that the
legitimacy of the legal system itself rests on our ability to expand the concept of "thinking like a lawyer" to incorporate the lived experiences and
socio-historical realities of all peoples subject to its jurisdiction.

I.

TRENZASY GRE14AS

Hair is a central theme of M6scaras:the time we spend on hair; the
stories we learn; the values we absorb as we braid the hair of our loved
ones or have ours braided by them; and the significance of the distinction
between neat, orderly trenzas and the unkempt, disheveled look implied
by grefras.'8 It is a medium brilliantly employed by Professor Montoya to
bridge the divide between our public, professional selves and that which
is intensely personal.
Hair can serve this function because it is a physical attribute over
which we exercise considerable discretion. Hair is inextricably linked to
our identities; what one chooses to do with one's hair inevitably communicates something about one's racial, cultural, and/or political identity as
well as individual personality. It signals something very significant about
how we see ourselves relating to the broader cultural contexts that surround us.19
17 See id. at 2-4.
18

See id.

See generally Paulette M. Caldwell, A HairPiece:Perspectiveson the Intersection ofRace
and Gender, 1991 DUKE L.J. 365 (1991); Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Another HairPiece:Exploring New Strands ofAnalysis Under Title VII, 98 GEO. L.J. 1079 (2010).
19
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Re-reading Miscaras evoked many images for me. I remembered
my mother braiding my hair throughout my whole childhood, and my
braiding of my daughter's hair. Just as Professor Montoya's trenzas "announced that [she] was clean and well-cared-for at home," 20 it was critical to me for my child -who is of African, Native, Asian, and European
descent but presumed black in this society-to be perceived by the outside world as cherished. Her father had grown up in the Jim Crow South,
and his child was not leaving the house without impeccably ironed clothing and neatly braided hair. Her appearance would convey that watchful
parents lurked just a few steps behind this vulnerable little girl. Seeing
my child from this perspective I wondered, for the first time, what my
white mother, raised in South Georgia, thought about as she prepared
her Japanese American child to go out into the world.
Miscaras reminded me of my first husband's dreadlocks- always
neatly groomed, but nonetheless prototypically greitudo.2' An African
American activist in Atlanta in the 1970s, Chimurenga, like Professor
Montoya's cousin Sonny, was one who, ultimately, "didn't survive 'la vida
loca."' 22 He wore locks when they were a political symbol, not a fashion statement. Frequently arrested for his political activity, Chimurenga
laughed about the time he had been put in a cell with six or seven other
black men, all complaining about being locked up for no reason. As it
dawned on him that each of them had cornrows or braids, he hoped we
would bail him out quickly, before his cellmates realized that they had
been arrested only because of the superficial resemblance between their
hair and his.23
During those years I used to wonder whether I would make a similar political statement with my hair if I were black. I was doubtful until I got to Yale Law School, where the term "alienated" took on new
meaning for me. Truly, I felt like a visitor from another planet. Like the
Harvard described by Professor Montoya, 24 Yale in the early 1980s was
Montoya, supra note

2, at 4.
See Montoya, supra note 2, at 24. On the term "dreadlocks," as well as its various
spellings and connotations, see D. Wendy Greene, Black Women Can't Have Blonde Hair ...
In the Workplace, 14 J. GENDER RACE & JusT. 405, 415 n.54 (2011).
22 Montoya, supra note 2, at 11.
23 On the conflation of such hairstyles, see Pitts v. Wild Animal Adventures, Inc., 2008 WL
1899306 at 1 (M.D. Ga. 2008) (unreported opinion granting summary judgment for defendant
in a challenge to a policy prohibiting uncovered "dreadlocks, cornrows, beads, and shells"); for
analysis, see Greene, supra note 21, at 414-16.
24 Montoya, supra note 2, at
24.
20
21
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infused with the presumptions of white privilege; a strangely contradictory place where people of color were rendered invisible while simultaneously having presumptive identities imposed upon us. Professor
Montoya talks about arriving at law school intent on "proclaim[ing]"
her politics; 25 likewise, it was only after I began law school that I realized
I needed to employ every means available to subvert the presumption
that I was there to assimilate into their world.
Re-reading Mdiscaras more recently, I had to consider how these
dynamics continue to affect me, even as a tenured professor with no ambitions beyond doing work that I find meaningful. I had to admit occasionally being discomfited by the fact that I do not "look like" a lawyer
or law professor because I wear my hair long and graying, while simultaneously knowing that this is a choice I make, in part, because it keeps me
grounded. Being visibly different makes it more difficult to slip into an
assimilationist mode. It reminds me of my Cree sister-in-law's admonitions about the spiritual significance of hair. Raised very traditionally by
her grandmother, she is currently a brilliant litigator and negotiator for
indigenous rights in Canada. 26 When I think of her, I'm reminded that it's
possible to make forays into the courts of the conqueror by day and still
come home at night; that our struggles for racial justice are but a small
part of a 500-year resistance to colonization, enslavement, and genocide.
I tell these stories, in part, because I believe they demonstrate how
Professor Montoya's autobiographical account of her experiences as a
Chicana can resonate with and open doors across a wide spectrum of
experience. But the power of Mdiscaras goes far beyond the liberating
effect it has at this very significant but nonetheless personal level. One
way in which it does this is by emphasizing the importance of the human
context to our work as lawyers and law professors.

25
26

Id. at 8.
For some of her published work, see generally

ISLANDS IN CAPTIVITY: THE RECORD OF

THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS HAWAIIANS (WARD CHURCHILL &
SHARON

H. VENNE

EDS.,

2004); Sharon Helen Venne,

OUR ELDERS UNDERSTAND OUR RIGHTS:

EVOLVING INTERNATIONAL LAw REGARDING INDIGENOUS
AMENDMENTS,

PEOPLES

(1998);

INDIAN ACTS AND

1868-1975: AN INDEXED COLLECTION (SHARON HELEN VENNE ED., reprinted

1998) (1981); Sharon Venne, The New Language ofAssimilation:A BriefAnalysis of ILO Convention 169, in WITHOUT PREJUDICE: THE EAFORD INT'L REV. OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION, Vol.
II, No. 2 at 53 (1990).
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CONTEXT

Legal cases turn on principles of law as applied to "the facts." Clients come to lawyers to tell their stories and, as lawyers, we know that
one of our most significant functions is to cull the legally relevant facts
from their narratives. In turn, as law professors, we spend a great deal
of time teaching our students this analytical skill.27 Margaret Montoya's
retelling of her encounter with the Josefina/Josephine Chdvez case exposes this dynamic and illustrates ways in which we are socialized to
suppress context in order to be considered legitimate participants in the
legal process.
Professor Montoya describes the case, decided in 1947, of a young
Chicana convicted of manslaughter after giving birth over the toilet in
her family's home and leaving the baby's body wrapped in newspaper under the bathtub.28 Margaret Montoya describes how, as the class debated
the legal issue of "whether the baby had been born alive for purposes of
the California manslaughter statute," she finally had to ask, "What about
the other facts? What about [Josefina's] youth, her poverty, her fear over
the pregnancy, her delivery in silence?" 29 "Why," she reflected, "did the
facts relating to the girl-woman's reality go unvoiced? Why were her life,
her anguish, her fears rendered irrelevant?" 3 0 Would the application of a
legal analysis that truly incorporated Josefina's reality have produced a
different outcome? We will never know whether the verdict would have
been different, but I am certain it would have made a difference in her
life and her community's perceptions about the legal system.
Jury trials dramatically illustrate the impact historical cultural context can have on legal proceedings. I have chosen the following examples
to demonstrate this point not because they are particularly distinctive
but because they have affected my life. These involve trials related to
missing and murdered children in Atlanta, protests of Columbus Day
See Angela Olivia Burton, Cultivating Ethical,Socially Responsible Lawyer Judgment:
Introducing the Multiple Lawyering Intelligences Paradigminto the Clinical Setting, 11 CLINICAL L. REV. 15, 16-19 (2004). On the exclusion of narrative from analyses of corporate law, see
generally Mae Kuykendall, No Imagination:The MarginalRole ofNarrativein CorporateLaw,
55 BuFF. L. REV. 537 (2007).
28 See Montoya, supra note 2, at 18 (referencing People v. Josephine Chavez, 176 P2d 92
(Cal. Ct. App. 1947), a case Professor Montoya recalled as having been titled People v. Josefina
Chavez).
29 Id. at 18.
so Id. at 18-19.
27
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celebrations in Denver, and the convictions of political activists Leonard
Peltier and Jamil Al-Amin.
The legal significance of social realities was first brought home to
me in connection with a highly publicized series of murders of young
black children in Atlanta in the late 1970s and early 1980s.31 As children
disappeared or were found dead, their parents and neighbors began to
organize, and to pressure city officials to acknowledge the problem and
provide them with some kind of protection. When this proved futile, a
coalition of tenants' associations in the city's housing projects organized
neighborhood patrols, each of which was to include someone who was
had firearms training and would be armed. At that time, under Georgia
law, one could carry an unconcealed pistol or rifle without a permit, as
the city attorney publicly stated to the patrols and the media. His explanation, however, did not stop the police from arresting the armed members of the first patrol, one of whom was Chimurenga.3 2
At trial, we were able to introduce evidence concerning the climate
of fear in these communities and why the adults felt obligated to protect
their children. The city attorney admitted that he had advised us, immediately prior to the arrests, that our approach was legal.33 Nonetheless,
the judge would not let the jury consider this information. Was the defendant armed? Did he have a permit? These were the only questions
the jury was allowed to consider and-those being uncontested factsthe jurors felt obliged to convict. Afterwards, several jurors spoke with
us, some in tears, explaining how unfair they considered the process.
But the more interesting part of the story occurred several years
later when a different judge was considering what to do about the fact
that Chimurenga had left the state (so that I could go to law school)
1 For background, see generally JAMES BALDWIN, THE EVIDENCE OF THINGS NoT SEEN (Reissued Ed., 1995); CHET DETLINGER & JEFF PRUGH, THE LIST (1984). A young black man, Wayne
Williams, was eventually convicted of killing two young men, and the cases of twenty-two
other victims, most much younger children, were declared "cleared" -i.e., "no further investigations would be undertaken" -without any further prosecutions. Napper v. Georgia Television Co., 257 Ga. 156, 158 (1987). The effects of these kidnappings and murders are perhaps
best depicted in Toni Cade Bambara's last novel. See generally TONI CADE BAMBARA, THOSE
BONES ARE NoT My CHILD (1999).
32 See Eugene Robinson, Atlanta Police Arrest Two in Citizens' Patrol:'WeAre Not Vigilantes,' Says One, WASH. POST, Mar. 21,1981, available at 1981 WLNR 459008.
3 See Around the Nation: 2 in Atlanta Citizens Patrol Seized on Weapons Charges, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 21, 1981, available at 1981 WLNR 225485. As this news article reports, it was unlawful to carry deadly weapons at a public gathering. However, this charge was dismissed on
the grounds that the crowd at issue consisted primarily of police and reporters.
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without completing the community service portion of his sentence. As
it happened, we had the same bailiff; one who, in terms of appearance,
could easily have been central casting's top choice to portray a classic
potbellied, redneck sheriff. This bailiff, who remembered the contextual
evidence that had been introduced at trial, muttered, "This man has done
more community service than anyone in the county." Everyone around
us started laughing, and the judge barked, "What did you say?" After the
bailiff reluctantly repeated his statement, the judge threw up his hands
and dismissed the case. My point, of course, is that both the jury and
the bailiff simply needed to be exposed to the realities underlying the
arrests to see that the formalistic application of law had little connection
to justice.
My second example comes from Denver where, during the 1990s
and early 2000s, the American Indian community and a broad coalition
of their allies made concerted efforts to stop an annual parade celebrating Columbus Day. Until the city enacted special ordinances directly intended to preclude these actions, 3 4 juries consistently acquitted those
arrested at the protests because they were allowed to hear evidence
about what Columbus symbolizes, as well as the harm done to Indian
children by the glorification of conquest and genocide.35 In 2004, over
240 people were arrested and by the end of the trial of "ringleaders,"
the jurors themselves were asking how they could join the protest the
following year.3 6
Another illustration of the importance of social context can be
found in the trial of Leonard Peltier, who is still in prison more than 35
years after his conviction for murder in connection with the deaths of
two FBI agents on the Pine Ridge Reservation in 1975. While Peltier's
case is quite well known, we often forget that his co-defendants, Darrelle
34 See Editorial,New Law Sets A Fine Line on ParadeProtest;Paradeorganizers and protesters continue their angry impasse over the disputed legacy of Christopher Columbus; Police
have new laws to enforce, DENVER PosT, Oct. 6,2005, at B6, available at 2005 WLNR 16228479.
" See Charlie Brennan, ParadeProtest Trial Starts; Opening Statements Draw on History,
Rights of Citizens, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Jan. 19, 2005, at 23A, available at 2005 WLNR 752934
(noting that "at times the proceedings sounded more like a civics lesson than a legal process");
Denver's 1st Columbus Day Paradein 9 Years Goes on Amid Protests; Holiday: Police arrest
about 150 activists, including Native American leaders,who said the explorer was a slave trader
who committed genocide, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2000, at 24, available at 2000 WLNR 8374630.
36 See Charlie Brennan, Columbus Day ParadeActivists Acquitted; Verdict May Bode Well
for 200 Others Arrested at Protest,ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Jan. 21, 2005, at 6A, available at 2005
WLNR 875744.
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(Dino) Butler and Robert Robideau, were acquitted in an earlier trial.3 7
A key difference in the proceedings was that Butler and Robideau were
allowed to introduce evidence about the violence and fear pervading the
Pine Ridge Reservation at the time.
Peltier, Robideau and Butler were members of the American Indian Movement (AIM), which had been targeted by the FBI and its surrogates on the reservation.38 In the Butler/Robideau trial, witnesses were
allowed to testify about being coerced by the FBI, a broader history of
FBI misconduct was introduced, and the jury heard about the numerous
unsolved murders of AIM members and supporters on the Pine Ridge
Reservation.39 According to historian Peter Matthiessen, "A determining
factor, as it turned out, was the testimony ... about the constant dread
that pervaded the atmosphere," including that of William Muldrow of
the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights.40 After hearing this, as well as
the testimony about FBI misconduct, an all-white Cedar Rapids, Iowa
jury concluded that Butler and Robideau may well have been acting in
self-defense. 41
Subsequently Leonard Peltier was extradited from Canada on the
basis of perjured affidavits, 42 and his trial was moved to Fargo, North
Dakota, where it was assigned to a different judge. There were many
problems with the trial, including the government's introduction of perjured testimony and falsified evidence, but the most damaging may have
been the new judge's exclusion of the contextualizing evidence that had
allowed the Cedar Rapids jury to understand Bob Robideau and Dino
Butler's actions. 43 Not surprisingly, Peltier was convicted. "In the end, it
1

See

PETER MATTHIESSEN, IN THE SPIRIT OF

CRAzY

HORSE: THE STORY OF LEONARD PELTIER

AND THE FBI's WAR ON THE AMERICAN INDIAN MOVEMENT

279-315 (1992); Joseph C. Hogan, III,
Guilty Until Proven Innocent: Leonard Peltier and the Sublegal System, 34 B.C. L. REV. 901,

907-08 (1993).
38

See

WARD CHURCHILL & JIM VANDER WALL, AGENTS OF REPRESSION: THE

FBI's

WARS AGAINST THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY AND THE AMERICAN INDIAN MOVEMENT

SECRET

179-233

(Classics Ed. 2002).
3 JIM MESSERSCHMIDT, THE TRIAL OF LEONARD PELTIER 40-41 (1983); for an excellent summary, see Randall Coyne, Defending the Despised:William Moses Kuntsler,20 AM. IND. L. REV.
257 269-73 (1995-1996).
4
MATTHIESSEN, supra note 37 at 313.
41 Id. (quoting jury foreperson).
42 For background on the extradition, see AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, PROPOSAL FOR A COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO THE EFFECT OF DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES ON CRIMINAL TRIALS
IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 41-46 (1981).
43 See Coyne, supra note 39, at 273-75; MATTHIESSEN,
SCHMIDT,

supra note 39, at 40.

supra note 37 at 316-72;
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was [the trial judge's] determination of what the jury should or should
not see and hear that became the deciding factor in the trial." 4 4
One final illustration is the case of Imam Jamil Al-Amin, the black
activist formerly known as H. Rap Brown, who was convicted in 2002
of killing a Georgia sheriff's deputy on the basis of highly contested
evidence. 45 During the 1960s, Al-Amin was a prominent target of FBI
COINTELPRO (counterintelligence) operations, and was repeatedly
arrested and jailed.4 6 Even after decades as a respected imam and community leader in Atlanta, he continued to be harassed throughout the
1990s. Consequently, many people, including Al-Amin, questioned his
indictment for the shooting of two deputy sheriffs serving a warrant
on him for failure to appear in connection with a traffic offense.47 As
Ekwueme Michael Thelwell asks, during a period when "working-class
African-American communities ... had been traumatized by a series

of shootings of unarmed black men [including Amadou Diallo] at the
hands of police," why would the Atlanta authorities "send into a Muslim
community, under cover of darkness, heavily armed men wearing flak
jackets to bring in a respected and beloved religious leader, a figure of
fixed address and regular and predictable habits?" 48
Nonetheless, the judge consistently excluded evidence of Al-Amin's
political history and the numerous documented attempts to frame him
for other crimes.49 At one point she simply decreed race to be irrelevant. 0 While the jury was predominantly black, what struck me, sitting
in that courtroom, was how young the jurors were. I could not help but
MATTHIESSEN, supra note 37 at 359.
45 See Steve Visser, Al-Amin Trial:King Widow Angers Kinchen Kin, ATLANTA J. & CONsT.,
44

Feb. 24, 2002, at C3, available at 2002 WLNR 4683662 (noting Coretta Scott King's concerns
about inconsistencies in the evidence).
46 On COINTELPRO operations targeting black activists, see generally CHURCHILL &
VANDER WALL, supra note 38; on the targeting of Al-Amin, see id. at 50, 58. See also Ekwueme
Michael Thelwell, H. Rap Brown/JamilAl-Amin:A Profoundly American Story, NATION, Mar.
18, 2002, at 6-7, available at 2002 WLNR 14068223.
47 See, e.g., Dahleen Glanton, Backers:Al-Amin victim of vendetta; Ex-Black Pantherno
killer, they say, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 11. 2002, at 8, available at 2002 WLNR 12634817; David Firestone, 60's Firebrand,Now Imam, Is Going on Trial in Killing, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6,2002, available

at 2002 WLNR 4098344.
48

Thelwell, H. Rap Brown, supra note 46, at 10-11.

49 See Lateef Mungin & Steve Visser, Al-Amin Trial:Judge Bars Questions on RacialMo-

tivations ATLANTA J. & CONST., Feb. 28, 2002, at D3, available at 2002 WLNR 4689469. See also
James Curry Woods, The Third Tower: The Effect of the September 1 1 th TerroristAttacks on the
American Jury System, 55 ALA. L. REV. 209,213-14 (2003).
o See Mungin & Visser, supra note 49.
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wonder how much they knew about the history of resistance to racism

in this country, whether they had any clue about the extent to which
federal officials, with the cooperation of state and local police, have been
willing to go to eliminate those they see as threats to the status quo.5 I
had to conclude that the prosecutor, too, believed in their nafvet6 when
I heard him argue that Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., would have wanted
the jurors to sentence Jamil Al-Amin to death. Ultimately Al-Amin was
sentenced to life without parole5 2 and, despite the fact that he was convicted in state court on state charges, he is now being held underground
in the federal supermax prison in Florence, Colorado.5 3 I often ponder
the effect that some exposure to the political and historical context of
this case might have had on the jury's verdict.

III.

ASSIMILATION AND GENOCIDE

Throughout Mdiscaras, Margaret Montoya highlights the pressure
placed on people of color in this country to assimilate and questions
the presumption that assimilation is something to which we should aspire. The lasting impact of this work can be attributed in large measure,
I believe, to this aspect of the piece. In her first paragraph, Professor
Montoya tells us that the article will "unbraid[] the stories" she provides
"to reveal an imbedded message: that Outsider storytelling is a discursive technique for resisting cultural and linguistic domination through
personal and collective redefinition."5 4 "Resisting cultural and linguistic
domination" is not simply a matter of feeling better about ourselves or
our families and cultures. It is, quite literally, about resisting genocide.
The term "genocide" was coined by the Polish Jewish jurist Rafael
Lemkin in 1944 to describe not just mass murder -that already had a
name and was already recognized as a crime-but coordinated efforts
to annihilate national, racial, or religious groups through actions that undermined the survival of the group qua group. As summarized by Ward
Churchill, Lemkin's "definition included attacks on political and social
institutions, culture, language, national feelings, religion, and the economic existence of the group. Even nonlethal acts that undermined the
liberty, dignity, and personal security of members of a group constituted
" See infra notes 84-104 and accompanying text.
52 Lateef Mungin & Steve Visser, Al-Amin Sentenced: Life Without Parolefor Killing
of
Deputy, ATLANTA I & CONST., Mar. 14, 2002, at A1, available at 2002 WLNR 4658046.
" Bill Rankin, Whatever Happened to ... Jamil Abdullah Al-Amin: Supermax prison gets
new inmate, ATLANTA I & CONST., Oct. 22, 2007, at B4, available at 2007 WLNR 20688845.
54 Montoya, supra note 2, at 1.
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genocide, if they contributed to weakening the viability of the group.""
Lemkin's definition initially articulated physical, biological, and cultural
forms of genocide56 but was watered down by the drafting committee
for the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (1948).17 Even so, the Convention is clear that genocide encompasses acts "committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a
national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such.""
Examples of genocide provided by the Convention include "forcibly transferring children of the group to another group."5 9 The children
at issue are not being killed -they are being removed from their families
and communities so that their cultures will not be able to survive and,
therefore, the "group, as such" will no longer exist. 60 That is the explicit
aim of "colorblind" assimilationism and why struggles to maintain our
cultures, histories, languages, religions, and other traditions are not just
about what is comfortable to us-or our "identity" in some superficial
sense -but about our survival as peoples. 61
" Ward Churchill, Definingthe Unthinkable:Towards a Viable Understandingof Genocide,
2 OR. REV. INT'L L. 3,11 (2000). See Rafael Lemkin, Axis RULE IN OCCUPIED EUROPE: LAWS OF
OCCUPATION, ANALYSIS OF GOVERNMENT, PROPOSALS FOR REDRESS 79-82 (1944).

Churchill, Defining the Unthinkable,supra note 55, at 15.
1 United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Jan. 12, 1951, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter "Genocide Convention"]. For
background on the compromises struck during the drafting process, see Kurt Mundorff, Other
Peoples' Children:A Textual and Contextual Interpretationofthe Genocide Convention,Article
2(E), 50 HARV. INT'L L.J. 61, 75-77 (2009). See also Daphne Anayiotos, The Cultural Genocide
Debate: Should the UN Genocide Convention Include a Provision on Cultural Genocide, or
Should the Phenomenon Be Encompassedin a Separate InternationalTreaty? 22 N.Y. INT'L L.
REV. 99, 113-14 (2009); Churchill,Defining the Unthinkable,supra note 55, at 13-15.
5 Genocide Convention, art. II.
5
Genocide Convention, art. 11 (e).
60 See Genocide Convention, art. II; see generally Mundorff, supra note 57
61 See generally Anayiotos, supra note 57 This was recognized by the Australian Human
Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, which concluded that "[t]he policy of forcible removal of children from Indigenous Australians to other groups for the purpose of raising them
separately from and ignorant of their culture and people could properly be labeled 'genocidal'
in breach of binding international law." Quoted in Mundorff, supra note 57 at 62. See also
Rose Weston, Facingthe Past,Facing the Future:Applyingthe Truth Commission Model to the
Historic Treatment of Native Americans in the United States, 18 Aiz. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1017
(2001) (noting the genocidal impact of assimilationist policies). On the effects on individuals
of the group, see Larry May, How Is Humanity Harmedby Genocide? 10 INT'L LEGAL THEORY
I, 18-19 (2004) (noting that genocide "devalues individuals by depriving them of membership
in social groups in such a way that it renders impossible the promise of equality to all humans"
and that assimilation leaves "the individual stand[ing] to the new group as an outsider").
56
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The admission or exclusion of context in the jury trials referenced
above was critical to the functioning of law as an instrument of justice
not only because context allows decisionmakers to understand individuals' motivations, but because it situates those individuals' actions within
the social dynamics and institutions that define their realities. Law, in
the abstract and as applied, can only function legitimately when there is
room within its structures to acknowledge and address the actual conditions of life encountered by those it governs.
To the extent the law presumes that we have all been, desire to be,
or should be assimilated into the dominant society, an irreconcilable conflict arises because these presumptions are at odds with what we must do,
collectively, to maintain our identities and, thereby, our existence as distinct peoples. Expanding the terrain of legally relevant facts to include
a broader context is an integral part of resisting genocide because we
cannot expect those who have not been exposed to the conditions of life
in poor communities and communities of color to understand the myriad
ways in which daily life can be a struggle to survive or the extent to which
resistance to assimilation is a necessary component of this struggle.
Professor Montoya identifies numerous factors that may have influenced Josefina Chfivez's actions -particularly the expectations surrounding sexuality and the issues of respect and shame that may have
been critical to her survival in her family and community. Young and
poor, living with her mother and sisters in a two bedroom house with a
bathroom off the porch, what options did she have? What options did
she perceive? 62 Even more significantly, why was everything most important to Josefina-"her life, her anguish, her fears" -irrelevant to a legal
analysis of the case? 63 The issue Professor Montoya raises is not whether
these factors justify the possible preclusion of a baby's life, but whether
real justice for such young women and their babies can be achieved
without their consideration. Some backdrop to the cases discussed above
helps illustrate this point.
From the perspective of those who formed armed community patrols during the Atlanta child murders, the central question was how
the adults in neighborhoods where children were disappearing could
fulfill their responsibilities to protect the next generation. Between
1979 and 1981, more than twenty young black children in Atlanta were
62

See Montoya, supra note 2, at 18-19.

63 Id.
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murdered, as were more than fifty others in their twenties. 64 The scenarios were terrifying -a seven-year-old snatched from her bed in the night,
her remains discovered four months later just down the street from her
home; 65 a nine-year-old who never made it home from an errand for a
neighbor, his strangled body later discovered at an abandoned school; 66
small, decomposed bodies of missing children being discovered, apparently at random.6 7 They were terrifying in the present and in their ability
to evoke the memories and despair associated with the South's bloody
history of slavery, lynching, rape, and children being snatched from their
parents. As James Baldwin observed:
[T]he missing children begin turning up, dead-in the weeds,
by the roadside, in abandoned sites, in the river. It is very
clear that whoever is murdering the children wants them to be
found as they are found: this brutally indifferent treatment of
the child's corpse is like spitting in the faces of the people who
produced the child. 68
Whatever the motivations of the actual killer(s), 69 a climate of fear
pervaded the communities on Atlanta's south side. We all knew a child
who had disappeared, or her parents, or some of his friends; worse yet,
the children were afraid, always. Appeals to the police had failed to protect the children; indeed they took every opportunity to blame the parents. 7 o City officials made it clear that Atlanta's national and international
reputation as a "city too busy to hate," i.e., an appealing destination for
tourists and convention business, trumped any responsibility they felt to
the local residents. 7' As reported in the New York Times in March 1981:
64

DETTLINGER & PRUGH, supra note 31, at 21-22. For a map, see id., unnumbered pages

following 93.
65 See id. at 178.
66 See id. at 55-58.
67 See generally id.
68

BALDWIN, supra note 31, at 5-6.

This is not the forum for a detailed critique of the evidence used to convict Wayne Williams for the murders of two adults, and the City's rapid closing of all possibly related cases.
The problems are aptly summarized, however, by James Baldwin's observation that "[t]he case
against Wayne Williams contains a hole so wide that the indisputably alert Abby Mann has
driven one of his many tanks through it." Id. at xv (also noting his disagreement with many
aspects of Mann's docudrama on the case).
69

7o See BAMBARA, supra note 31, at 5-6.
71 For an incisive analysis of the atmosphere in Atlanta, and the official responses to the

murders, see generally BALDWIN, supra note 31.
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In the past 19 months 20 black children between the ages of 7
and 16 have been murdered and two others are officially listed
as missing. Mayor Jackson asked residents yesterday to "lower
their voices" about the possibility that the slayings were the
work of a racist. 7 2
Because these realities were introduced at the trial of members of the
community patrol, the jurors and the bailiff understood that our choice
was to abdicate our most fundamental responsibility to protect the children and, thereby, our own humanity, or to resist the terror being inflicted, again, on our communities.
In Denver, resistance to the glorification of Columbus and his legacy has been rooted in a similar need to ensure the survival of American
Indian children. The fundamental right -indeed, responsibility -to oppose the advocacy of genocide was the centerpiece of the defense in each
of the trials arising from the mass demonstrations against the celebration
of Columbus Day as an official holiday. Members of the American Indian Movement of Colorado, as well as some sixty allied organizations,
worked tirelessly to educate the public and the juries about Columbus'
policies of slavery and systematic extermination of indigenous peoples,
and the evolution of this legacy through some five centuries of illegal
warfare, massacres, and policies such as scalp bounties that promoted the
outright murder of American Indians. 73
These educational efforts also highlighted federal policies that resulted in the involuntary sterilization of more than forty percent of Native women of childbearing age, the forcible removal to boarding schools
of approximately half of all indigenous children for several generations
in succession, and a widespread program to place Indian children with
non-Indian families for adoption. As noted by the defendants in one
case, "The stated goal of such policies has been to bring about the 'assimilation' of native people into the value orientations and belief system of
their conquerors. Rephrased, the objective has been to bring about the
72 Around the Nation:Activists in Atlanta Vow to Begin
Armed Patrols,N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19,
1981, at A14, availableat 1981 WLNR 228989.
7 See Ward Churchill, Bringing the Law Home: Application of the Genocide Convention
in the United States, in WARD CHURCHILL, INDIANS ARE US? CULTURE AND GENOCIDE IN NATIVE
NORTH AMERICA 28-42 (1994) (essay adapted from a brief submitted by defendants in 1992).
For historical background, see generally WARD CHURCHILL, A LITTLE MATTER OF GENOCIDE:
HOLOCAUST AND DENIAL IN THE AMERICAS, 1492 TO THE PRESENT (1997). On Columbus, see
generally KIRKPATRICK SALE,THE CONQUEST OF PARADISE: CHRISTOPHER COLUMBUS AND THE COLUMBIAN LEGACY (1990).
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disappearance of indigenous societies as such, a patent violation of ...
the Genocide Convention."7 4
The heart of the matter, however, was the impact this largely untold history continues to have on American Indian communities, and the
devastating effect that glorifying its perpetrators has on Indian children.
I was privileged to be among those who went to trial following a 2004
protest in which some 244 people were arrested. While the jurors were
clearly disconcerted by the historical truths confronting them, I believe
they were most deeply moved by the testimony that linked these governmental policies to the realities of life in so many Indian communities today-the devastating poverty, widespread unemployment, substandard
housing, endemic disease and truncated life expectancy, and the high
rates of depression, alcoholism, and violence that accompany these conditions of life.75
The jurors heard about the extraordinarily high rates of suicide
amongst Indian youth and how difficult it is for parents to prevent their
children from internalizing the negative messages they receive about
themselves on all fronts, even from their elementary school teachers who
ridicule and punish them for contesting the Columbus myth. The prosecution countered with a narrow legal argument: those participating in
the Columbus Day parade had a right to exercise their First Amendment
rights. In other words, we had the right to stand on the sidewalk and
express contrary opinions but not a right, much less an obligation, to
prevent the advocacy of genocide. Ours was a world about which the
jurors knew precious little, but just a few days of exposure to the devastating realities of life in native North America allowed them to understand that we were not defending abstract principles but the survival of
the people. 76
Churchill, Bringing the Law Home, supra note 73, at 39.
For background, see generally Ryan Seelau, Regaining Control Over the Children:Reversing the Legacy ofAssimilative Policies in Education, Child Welfare, and Juvenile Justice that
TargetedNative American Youth, 37 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 63 (2012-2013).
76 On the impact of federal policies on American Indian children, see Lorie M. Graham,
Reparations,Self-Determination, and the Seventh Generation, 21 HARV. Hum. Rrs. J. 47 68-70
(2008); see generally WARD CHURCHILL, KILL THE INDIAN, SAVE THE MAN: THE GENOCIDAL IM74

PACT OF AMERICAN INDIAN RESIDENTIAL SCHOOLS (2004). On the dangers of assimilationist pol-

icies, see Rennard Strickland, Genocide-at-Law:An Historic and Contemporary View of the
Native American Experience, 34 U. Kan. L. Rev. 713,722-23 (1985-1986); John W. Ragsdale, Jr.,
The ChiricahuaApaches and the Assimilation Movement, 1865-1886:A HistoricalExamination,
30 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 291, 309 (2005-2006) (noting that both military extermination policies
and the establishment of reservations were genocidal).
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The context provided to the jury in the Columbus Day trials also

formed, in general terms, the backdrop to the trials of AIM members
Dino Butler, Bob Robideau, and Leonard Peltier who were on the Pine
Ridge Reservation in 1975 at the request of local elders. This reservation
was one of the most destitute locations in the country and remains so
today.77 In the mid-1970s, 88% of the homes on Pine Ridge were classified as substandard; many did not even have plumbing. 8 In 1973, the
median annual income of Lakota families on the reservation was under
$2,000.79 Unemployment reached into the eightieth and ninetieth percentiles, especially in the harsh winter months, 0 and male life expectancy
on Pine Ridge was 44 years, some 30 years less than that of the general
population."
Traditional Oglala Lakota residents on the Pine Ridge Reservation were deeply concerned not only about these devastating conditions
of life, but also the willingness of the fraudulently elected tribal chairman Richard Wilson to transfer Lakota lands to non-Indians and to the
federal government.8 2 Losing their land would preclude their ability to
maintain their culture and spiritual traditions and, thus, their survival as
a people. Wilson, determined to suppress the growing resistance to his
policies, deployed "a private army, called the GOONs (Guardians Of the
Oglala Nation), equipped and funded by the U.S. government," which
engaged in "a campaign of terrorism directed against traditionals and
activists. ... "83
77 In 2010, Shannon County, home to Pine Ridge Reservation, "had the lowest per capita
income in the entire United States." Nicolas D. Kristof, Poverty'sPoster Child,N.Y. TIMES, May
10, 2012, at Al, available at 2012 WLNR 9811368. See also Peter I. Kilborn, Life at the Bottom-America's Poorest County/A special report; Sad Distinctionfor the Sioux: Homeland is
No. 1 in Poverty, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 1992, at 11, available at 1992 WLNR 3348945.
7 See Rennard Strickland, Indian Law and the Miner's Canary: The Signs of Poison Gas,
39 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 483, 488 (1991) (citing THOMAS B. WILLIAMS & ROBERT D. LEATHERMAN,
INDIAN HOUSING IN THE UNITED STATES 31-32 (1975)).
79 MESSERSCHMIDT, supra note 39, at 5.
so See Matthew Atkinson, Red Tape:HowAmericanLaws EnsnareNativeAmerican Lands,
Resources, and People,23 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 379, 420-421 (1998). Generally, these statistics
reflect the realities in the 1970s and currently. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
sI Id. It is now reported to be 58 for men and 66 for women in Pine Ridge, approximately
20 years shorter than the national average. See Astrid Rodrigues, Stuck in 'Food Desert,' Pine
Ridge Locals Look to Subway to Meet Nutrition Needs (Oct. 14, 2011), available at http://abcnews.go.com/US/stuck-food-desert-pine-ridge-locals-subway-meet/story?id=14732285
(last
visited Aug. 15, 2013).
82 See MESSERSCHMIDT, supra note 39, at 3-5.
Jim Vander Wall, A Warrior Caged: The Continuing Struggle of LeonardPeltier, in THE
STATE OF NATIVE AMERICA: GENOCIDE, COLONIZATION, AND RESISTANCE 292 (M.ANNETTE JAIMES,
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The American Indian Movement presence on the reservation, at
the request of the traditional Oglalas, was countered by ever-increasing
violence on the part of the GOONs. From mid-1973 through mid-1976,
nearly 70, perhaps more, AIM members or supporters were murdered
(and many others assaulted) on Pine Ridge. 8 4 During this period, the
FBI, which had criminal jurisdiction on the reservation, failed to convict a single person for these murders." Instead, federal resources were
poured into attempts to destroy AIM through the use of infiltrators and
agents provocateurs, the prosecution of unfounded charges against AIM
members, and the arming of the GOONs.8 6
The traditional Oglalas and their supporters were very literally under siege, resisting yet another U.S. government campaign to eliminate
their existence as a people capable of maintaining their own history, culture, language, and religion. Pine Ridge is, of course, the site of the 1890
Wounded Knee massacre, in which some 300 Lakotas, including women,
children and elders, were slaughtered by the U.S. Army.8 ' Two years before the incident at issue in the Peltier trial, AIM members and supporters had been subjected to a 71-day siege by U.S. federal agents, who fired
"hundreds of thousands of rounds of ammunition" into the tiny village of
Wounded Knee and, subsequently, arrested 562 people on charges that
overwhelmingly proved groundless."" It was against this backdrop that
two federal agents -allegedly serving a warrant for the theft of a pair
of used cowboy boots -instigated a firefight in which they and a young
American Indian were killed. 89 Understanding this context led the Cedar
Rapids jury to acquit Butler and Robideau; its exclusion may well have
resulted in Peltier's conviction. 90
ED., 1992).
84

Ward Churchill with Jim Vander Wall, AIM Casualties on Pine Ridge, 1973-1976, in

CHURCHILL, INDIANS ARE Us?, supra note 73, at 197 This gave the reservation a murder rate

more than eight times higher than Detroit, then known as the "murder capital" of the United
States. Id. at 204.
8 Vander Wall, A Warrior Caged,supra note 83, at 294.
86 See CHURCHILL &VANDER WALL, AGENTS OF REPRESSION, supra note 38, at 179-233.
87 See Allison M. Dussias, Ghost Dance and Holy Ghost: The Echoes of Nineteenth-Century ChristianizationPolicy in Twentieth-Century Native American Free Exercise Cases, 49
STAN. L. REV. 773, 797-799 (1997).
" Vander Wall, "A Warrior Caged," supra note 83, at 293 (noting that the government
ultimately obtained fifteen convictions, mostly for minor offenses).

89 See CHURCHILL &VANDER WALL, AGENTS OF REPRESSION, supra note 38, at 236-246.
9

See supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text.
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Just as the American Indian Movement had been targeted for destruction by federal agencies,9 ' virtually every African American organization active in the 1960s and 1970s was the focus of counterintelligence
operations by the FBI and numerous other governmental entities.9
Persons of African descent in the Americas have been resisting slavery,
lynchings, legally mandated political exclusion and social segregation,
dispossession of their lands, mass incarceration, and forced cultural assimilation for nearly 500 years. 93 The resources of state power have been

consistently used to suppress these movements, and the government's
response to the political activism of the civil rights and black liberation
movements of the 1960s was no exception. 94
Beginning in 1964, Jamil Al-Amin, then known as H. Rap Brown,
worked with the voter registration projects of the Student Nonviolent
Coordinating Committee (SNCC) in Mississippi and Alabama. He was
just twenty-three years old when he succeeded Stokely Carmichael,
later known as Kwame Ture, as SNCC chairman in 196795 Al-Amin also
served briefly as the honorary Minister of Justice of the Black Panther

Party.96 SNCC was a major target of the FBI, as, of course, was the Black
Panther Party.97 In the FBI's memorandum initiating its Black Liberation
See generally CHURCHILL & VANDER WALL, AGENTS OF REPRESSION, supra note 38.
See Natsu Taylor Saito, Whose Liberty? Whose Security? The USA PATRIOTAct in the
Context of COINTELPRO and the Unlawful Repression of PoliticalDissent, 81 OR. L. REV.
1051, 1094-96 (2002).
93 See generally JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN & EVELYN HIGGINBOTHAM, FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM: A HISTORY OF AFRICAN AMERICANS ( 9 th Ed. 2010); VINCENT HARDING, THERE IS A RIVER:
THE BLACK STRUGGLE FOR FREEDOM IN AMERICA (1981); WINTHROP D. JORDAN, WHITE OVER
BLACK: AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARD THE NEGRO, 1550-1812 (1968); EUGENE D. GENOVESE,
91
92

FROM REBELLION TO REVOLUTION: AFRO-AMERICAN SLAVE REVOLTS IN THE MAKING OF THE MOD-

(1979). On efforts to preserve cultural identity, see generally BLACK NATIONALISM
H. BRACEY ET AL., EDS., 1970).
94 See generally MANNING MARABLE, RACE, REFORM, AND REBELLION: THE SECOND RECONSTRUCTION AND BEYOND IN BLACK AMERICA, 1945-2oo6 (2007); JEFFREY O.G. OGBAR, BLACK
POWER: RADICAL POLITICS AND AFRICAN AMERICAN IDENTITY (2004); KENNETH O'REILLY, "RACIAL MATTERS": THE FBI's SECRET FILE ON BLACK AMERICA, 1960-1972 (1989). For the findings
ERN WORLD

IN AMERICA (JOHN

of a Senate investigation of such programs, see generally SENATE SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GovERNMENT OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, FINAL REPORT, BOOKS

11

AND

III (1976).
95 See Ekwueme Michael Thelwell, Forewordto H. RAP BROWN, DIE NIGGER DIE! A POLITICAL AUTOBIOGRAPHY XiV-XVi
96

See

(2002).

WARD CHURCHILL & JIM VANDER WALL, THE

COINTELPRO

PAPERS: DOCUMENTS

FBI's SECRET WARS AGAINST DISSENT IN THE UNITED STATES 126 (Classics Ed., 2002).
See id. at 111 (reproduction of FBI memorandum of Mar. 4, 1968). See also MARABLE,

FROM THE
97

supra note 94, at 109 (noting that SNCC was the first radical black group targeted, and that the
Black Panther Party had been the subject of some 233 separate COINTELPRO operations by
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Movement COINTELPRO operation, J. Edgar Hoover stated explicitly
that its purpose was "to expose, disrupt, misdirect, discredit, or otherwise
neutralize the activities of black nationalist, hate-type organizations and
groups, their leadership, spokesmen, membership, and supporters... ."9
In August 1967, Brown was listed, along with Stokely Carmichael, Elijah
Muhammed, and Maxwell Stanford, as an "extremist" who should be
afforded "[i]ntensified attention."99 That month, he was charged with incitement to riot and eventually imprisoned for five years for carrying a
rifle across state lines while under indictment. 00
The FBI's COINTELPRO operations targeting "black nationalist-hate groups"' 0 involved not only surveillance but also infiltration by
informants and agents provocateurs, the distribution of disinformation
intended to discredit the organizations and to create rifts both within
and among groups, repeated arrests on pretextual charges, convictions
obtained on the basis of perjured testimony and falsified evidence, and
even assassinations. 102 Many of these tactics continued to be utilized
against Jamil Al-Amin through the 1990s. Thus, for example, Al-Amin
was arbitrarily detained and interrogated by federal agents immediately
after the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, without any evidence
tying him to the attack.103 Two years later he was arrested by FBI and
ATF agents who claimed that the victim of a shooting in his Atlanta
neighborhood had identified him as the gunman, but the charges had to
be dropped when the victim "told the press that he had not seen his assailant but had been threatened by the authorities with jail if he did not
implicate Imam Al-Amin."104
Jamil Al-Amin always struggled in ways he believed necessary
for the survival of the black community. In 1969 he wrote that "[t]he
repeated attempts that the government has made to silence me represent just one level of genocide that is practiced by america," going on
July 1969).
98

CHURCHILL & VANDER WALL, COINTELPRO PAPERS, supra note 96, at 92 (reproduction

of FBI memorandum of Aug. 25,1967).
9 See id. at 93 (reproduction of FBI memorandum of Aug. 25, 1967).
"oo
See MARABLE, supra note 94, at 109.
"o'See CHURCHILL & VANDER WALL, COINTELPRO PAPERS, supra note 96, at 111 (repro-

duction of FBI memorandum of Mar. 4, 1968).
102See CHURCHILL & VANDER WALL, AGENTS OF REPRESSION, supra note 38, at 37-62; Saito,
supra note 92, at 1081-88.
103
Thelwell, H. Rap Brown, supra note 46, at 8-9.
1Id. at 9 (also discussing irregularities concerning this incident noted by the Council on
American-Islamic Relations and other national Muslim organizations).
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to explain the many ways in which he believed black Americans to be
the targets of genocidal policies and practices.10s He concluded by noting
that, although his attorney had recently secured his release from custody,
"one day ... I will be arrested and there will be no legal procedure any
lawyer will be able to use to secure my release."'06 This proved true in
2002, when Al-Amin's future was placed in the hands of a jury that had
little if any understanding of this country's history of repressing political
dissent and a judge who ensured that the jury learned nothing about the
federal government's on-going attempts to indict and convict him. Not
surprisingly, the jury was unable to fathom why one might question the
veracity of the government's evidence, much less place the case in the

context of genocidal policies and practices.

IV.

REPRESSION AND DENIAL (OR, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER)

As these examples illustrate, the conditions of life affecting individuals whose actions are being judged by the law differ dramatically with
respect to cultural and historical context. While no one seriously contests
the nexus between legal justice and the realities of life, it is also clear that
the legitimacy of law depends on the consistency and predictability of its
application.'0 7 This principle is often cited as the basis for distinguishing
those facts accepted as legally relevant from those deemed sociological.10s As lawyers, we are supposed to erase the personalities at issue, and
objectively apply neutral principles to facts. However, this formulation
disregards the extent to which context is routinely taken into consideration, and the presumptions about context that are routinely applied to
individuals, regardless of their actual circumstances. As summarized by
Robert Cover, "No set of legal institutions or prescriptions exists apart
from the narratives that locate it and give it meaning ... In this normative world, law and narrative are inseparably related."109
There are many situations in which a judge or jury considers a defendant's actions or intent from the perspective of a "reasonable" person, but this hypothetical reasonable person is rarely situated within the
1os BROWN,
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supra note 95, at 107 (deliberately spelling "america" without a capital).

Id. at 108.

1o7 While definitions of "the rule of law" vary considerably, these elements are undisputed.
For a useful summary of key formulations of the rule of law, see Berta Esperanza Hernandez-Truyol, The Rule of Law and Human Rights, 16 FLA. J. INT'L L. 167, 168-176 (2004).
10
s See Toni M. Massaro, Empathy,Legal Storytelling, and the Rule of Law: New Words, Old
Wounds? 87 MICH. L. REV. 2099,2110-2116 (1989).
109 Robert M. Cover, Nomos and Narrative,97 HARV. L. REv. 4,4-5 (1983).
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defendant's social, cultural, or historical framework.110 Instead, what is
"reasonable" is determined by the worldview of the decisionmakers. This
is a society in which the histories, perspectives, and contemporary realities of subordinated or marginalized peoples are routinely excluded
from or distorted by the mainstream education and media, and in which
social segregation results in a very limited range of personal interaction
across racial, ethnic or class boundaries. As a result, those making decisions about legally relevant context inevitably, and understandably, project their own experiences and beliefs.
The abstract directive of legal "neutrality" fails to take into account
that the histories and contemporary realities of subordinated peoples in
this society are simply erased from the dominant paradigm. This is why
the "storytelling" exemplified by Mdscaras is a necessary component of
justice. As Charles Lawrence puts it, "We tell our stories because other
scholars have not told them, leaving us largely invisible in the discourses
of law and social science.""'
The jury system is intended to bring a wider spectrum of lived experience to the decision-making process, but judges limit the evidence
that can be considered by juries in accordance with their own assessment
of what is legally relevant.112 Judges, for the most part, are "successful"
lawyers -educated in a system that imposes narrow constraints on legal
relevance and selected on the basis of their compliance with established
rules and dominant cultural norms. They rarely have personal experiences that would motivate them to act outside of these parameters and,
even when tempted to do so, it is painfully clear that deviation from stare
decisis is only likely to result in their decisions being overturned and
their careers short-circuited." 3
I" For a critique of the "reasonable person" standard, see Andr6 Douglas Pond Cummings,
"Lions and Tigers and Bears, Oh My" or "Redskins and Braves and Indians, Oh Why": Ruminations on McBride v. Utah State Tax Commission, Political Correctness,and the Reasonable
Person,36 CAL. W. L. REV. 11, 26-31 (1999).
. Charles Lawrence III, Listeningfor Stories in All the Rights Places:Narrativeand Racial
Formation Theory, 46 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 247 251 (2012).
112For examples of the exclusion of relevant evidence in criminal trials, see generally John
H. Blume, Sheri L. Johnson, & Emily C. Paavola, Every Juror Wants a Story: Narrative Relevance, Third Party Guilt and the Right to Presenta Defense, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1069 (2007).
113
Such limitations also impact the ability of judges to formulate appropriate policies concerning the assessment of relevance. One glaring example is the requirement that only intentional, rather than institutional, discrimination is actionable. See generally David Crump,
Evidence, Race, Intent, and Evil: The Paradox of Purposelessnessin the ConstitutionalRacial
DiscriminationCases, 27 HOFSTRA L. REV. 285 (1998).
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The constraints placed on judges are illustrated in a case filed in
1996 by Elouise Cobell against the Secretary of the Interior for the failure
to properly manage, account for, or provide lawful benefits to 300,000400,000 American Indians on whose behalf perhaps as much as $137
billion had been placed, by government fiat, in individual trust accounts
controlled by the Interior Department.114 Three years later, following a
six-week bench trial, district judge Royce Lamberth ordered the defendants to comply with their trust duties and, based on "the defendants'
recalcitrance toward remedying their mismanagement despite decades
of congressional directives," retained jurisdiction over the matter." 5 After another six years of bureaucratic intransigence that he described as
"a nightmare,"116 Judge Lamberth ordered the Department of the Interior to include a notice with all written communications to Indian trust
beneficiaries warning them that "the government is currently unable to
provide ... an accurate and complete accounting of their trust assets." "7
As a former Judge Advocate General at the Pentagon, appointed to
the federal bench by Ronald Reagan and named Presiding Judge of the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court by then-Chief Justice William
Rehnquist,"' it is doubtful that Judge Lamberth has ever been characterized as a bleeding heart liberal or a critical race theorist. However,
by 2005, he had apparently gained some insight into what it meant to be
treated like an Indian in contemporary America:
The case is nearly a decade old, the docket sheet contains over
3000 entries.... But when one strips away the convoluted statutes, the technical legal complexities, the elaborate collateral
proceedings, and the layers upon layers of interrelated orders
and opinions from this Court and the Court of Appeals, what
remains is the raw, shocking, humiliating truth at the bottom:
114 See Complaint to Compel Performance of Trust Obligations, Cobell v. Babbitt,
30 E
Supp. 2d 24 (D.D.C. 1998) (No. 1:96CV01285), 1996 WL 34443583 (D.D.C.). On the number of
plaintiffs and their losses, see 1.S. Twibell, Rethinking Johnson v. M'Intosh (1823): The Root of
the Continued Forced Displacement ofAmerican IndiansDespite Cobell v. Norton (2001), 23
GEO. JMMIGR. L.J. 129,131 (2008). For background on the case and its purported settlement, see
generally Dennis M. Gingold & M. Alexander Pearl, Tribute to Elouise Cobell, 33 PUB. LAND &
RESOURCES L. REV. 189 (2012).
Cobell v. Babbit, 91 E Supp. 2d 1, 7 (D.D.C. 1999).
116
Cobell v. Norton, 229 ER.D. 5,7 (D.D.C.2005).
117See Cobell v. Kempthorne, 455 E3d 317, 320 (D.C. Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1317
(2007).
11
sSee Senior Judge Royce C Lamberth, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT
oF COLUMBIA, http://www.dcd.uscourts.gov/dcd/lamberth (last visited Aug. 17, 2013).
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After all these years, our government still treats Native American Indians as if they were somehow less than deserving of
the respect that should be afforded to everyone in a society
where all people are supposed to be equal.
For those harboring hope that the stories of murder, dispossession, forced marches, assimilationist policy programs, and
other incidents of cultural genocide against the Indians are
merely the echoes of a horrible, bigoted government-past that
has been sanitized by the good deeds of more recent history,
this case serves as an appalling reminder of the evils that result
when large numbers of the politically powerless are placed at
the mercy of institutions engendered and controlled by a politically powerful few."9
Citing this and other portions of Judge Lamberth's 2005 opinion, as well
as the many occasions on which it had reversed his rulings, the Court of
Appeals removed him from the case in July 2006.120 The appellate judges
were particularly troubled by Judge Lamberth's "apparent belief that
racism at Interior is not just a thing of the past," as well as his failure to
recognize that even had the Department's motives been relevant, "as
they would be in a discrimination case," such motivation "had nothing to
do with the issue [of notice] pending" before the court.121
As the Court of Appeals decision to remove Judge Lamberth demonstrates, sometimes the drive to exclude relevant evidence and historical context is attributable not simply to a lack of understanding or exposure to certain realities but to fear about the implications of admitting or
Cobell, 229 ER.D. at 7 See also Twibell, supra note 114, at 131.
Cobell, 455 E3d at 326-335.
A disturbing parallel is seen in the recent removal of a federal judge from a case involving racial bias in the New York City Police Department (NYPD). In August 2013, after a 10week trial, federal district judge Shira Scheindlin ruled that the constitutional rights of black
and Latino plaintiffs had been violated by the NYPD's stop-and-frisk policies. See Floyd v.
City of New York, 959 ESupp.2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).The Second Circuit Court of Appeals not
only stayed Judge Scheindlin's order regarding remedial measures pending appeal, but also
removed Judge Scheindlin from the case for failing to maintain the "appearance of impartiality." Ligon v. City of New York, 538 Fed.Appx. 101 (2d Cir. 2013) (unpublished opinion). The
disqualification of the judge was upheld in Ligon v. City of New York, 736 E3d 118 (2d Cir.
2013). According to the Center for Constitutional Rights, "'That, unprompted, they should
reassign the case from a judge deeply steeped in the issues for the last 14 years, who gave the
city every opportunity to defend itself in the course of this litigation, is troubling and unprecedented."' Alana Semuels, Court blocks ruling that halted N Y's stop-and-frisk,CHI. TRIB., Nov.
1, 2013, availableat 2013 WLNR 27479280.
119
120
121
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exposing the real history of this country and the ongoing consequences
of its genocidal policies. 12 2 Following Leonard Peltier's conviction, he
attempted to escape from prison because he had been informed of a government-sponsored plan to have him assassinated by a fellow inmate.123
An attorney in a subsequent hearing concerning this escape attempt
characterized the judge's reaction to Peltier's defense as follows: "It's impossible that this could ever happen, and therefore I don't want to hear
anything about it, and I don't want any witnesses talking about it."1 24
A similar dynamic was evident when my husband Ward Churchill,
former Chair of the Ethnic Studies Department at the University of
Colorado-Boulder, was fired in 2007 following a media firestorm and
intense political pressure concerning his explanation of why the United
States' long history of genocidal policies might generate the sort of anger and desperation underlying the September 11, 2001 attacks on the
World Trade Center and Pentagon.125 University officials contended that
Ward had been fired not for his political opinions, but rather for research
misconduct.126 Tellingly, however, a significant number of the alleged research misconduct charges devolved upon his documentation of the U.S.
Army's deliberate infliction of smallpox on American Indian nations.127
At the time he was fired, Ward Churchill was one of the most frequently cited American Indian Studies scholars in the country, having
I have summarized some of this history in NATSU TAYLOR SAITO, MEETING THE ENEMY:
(2010).
123 MATTHIESSEN, supra note 37 at 374-404.
124
Id. at 400, quoting attorney Lewis Gurwitz.
125 His initial essay and extensive documentation of this history can be found
in WARD
CHURCHILL, ON THE JUSTICE OF ROOSTING CHICKENS: REFLECTIONS ON THE CONSEQUENCES OF
U.S. IMPERIAL ARROGANCE AND CRIMINALITY (2003), a book which received a Gustavus Myers
Award for Outstanding Books on Human Rights. See generally Richard Delgado, Shooting
the Messenger, 20 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 477 (2005-2006) (reviewing WARD CHURCHILL, ON THE
JUSTICE OF ROOSTING CHICKENS: REFLECTIONS ON THE CONSEQUENCES OF U.S. IMPERIAL ARROGANCE AND CRIMINALITY (2003)).
1 26
For background on the political response, see Henry A. Giroux, Academic Freedom Under Fire:The Casefor CriticalPedagogy,C. LITERATURE, Oct. 1, 2006, 1, availableat 2006 WLNR
19699177; Kevin L. Cope, Defending the Ivory Tower:A Twenty-First Century Approach to the
Pickering-ConnickDoctrineand Public HigherEducation FacultyAfter Garcetti,33 J.C. & U.L.
LAw 313, 342-43 (2007). For a detailed assessment of the University's claims and the processes
employed to terminate Churchill's employment, see generally Ward Churchill, The Myth of
Academic Freedom: Experiencing the Application of Liberal Principle in a Neoconservative
Era,WORKS AND DAYS 51/52, 53/54: Vols. 26 & 27 (2008-09) at 139-230.
1 For a deconstruction of the charges by an expert in American Indian Studies, see generally Eric Cheyfitz, FramingWard Churchill:The Political Constructionof Research Misconduct,
WORKS AND DAYS 51/52,53/54: Vols. 26 & 27 (2008-09) at 231-252.
122

AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND INTERNATIONAL LAw
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published more than twenty books and 120 articles, most of which highlighted the genocidal destruction of American Indian peoples and the
political repression of those who resisted such actions.128 From the beginning, it was clear to us that while the attacks on Ward and his scholarship
were framed in very personal terms, the underlying motivation was to
discredit this trajectory of historical documentation and interpretation.
As stated in a 2006 resolution from an Emergency Summit of Scholars
and Activists Defending Critical Thinking and Indigenous Studies, "[T]
he attacks on Ward Churchill ... are being used to chill the expression of
counterhegemonic truths, to re-impose a 'consensus' history dictated by
the perspective of the colonizers, and to fuel racist attacks on students
and scholars of color."129 The resolution went on to recognize the attacks
as "part of a ... movement to undermine the disciplines of Indigenous,
Ethnic, and Gender studies which emerged as a result of protracted community-based struggles in response to the failures of mainstream disciplines to accurately reflect our collective histories and realities."13 0
Similarly, in 2007, law professor Deborah Post wrote, "One suspects
that the criticism of Churchill's scholarship is not simply about evidence
or omissions or erroneous statements of facts. It may be a visceral reaction to the use of the term 'genocide' and to the assignment of blame to
the U.S. government or military."' 3 ' A Colorado professor who was part
of the university committee that accused Ward Churchill of research misconduct unwittingly confirmed this point. After being fired, Ward sued
the University for retaliatory termination and, at trial, this committee
member testified that one of the dangers of his scholarship was that it
might "caus[e] some young man to become incredibly bitter to where he
picks up an AR-15 some day and kills a bunch of people."13 2 This comSee Cheri J. Deatsch & Heidi Boghosian, Brief of Amicus Curiae in Support of Ward
Churchill,68 NAT'L L. GUILD REV. 174 (2011).
129Resolution from the Emergency Summit of Scholars and Activists Defending
Critical
Thinking and Indigenous Studies, Lawrence,KS, September 29-30, 2006,UNeuI CONSCIENCE 1,
http://archived.wardchurchill.net/indig-onf resol.pdf (last visited Aug. 17, 2013).
"Iold. These observations are detailed in a Petition to the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights submitted on behalf of Ward Churchill against the United States of America,
September 30, 2013, available at http://wardchurchill.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/PETITIONWARD-CHURCHILL-V.-UNITED-STATES.pdf (last visited Oct. 18,2013).
1I Deborah Waire Post, Academic Freedom as Private Ordering:Politics and Professionalism in the 21" Century, 53 Loy. L. REV. 177 208 (2007).
132 Testimony of Donald Dean Morley, Professor of Communications at the University of
Colorado at Colorado Springs and member of the Privilege and Tenure Committee, Churchill v. University of Colorado, Trial Transcript, March 27 2009, 3422, lines 10-15 (on file with
128
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mittee member, charged with judging the veracity of Ward's scholarship,
had no background or expertise in American Indian Studies 33 but it was
clear that, like the judge in the Peltier case, he did not believe it possible
for the U.S. government to have acted as depicted in Ward's writings, did
not want to hear about it, and did not want anyone talking about it.13 4
Apparently this professor believed that if the history of the genocidal policies and practices employed by the U.S. government against
indigenous peoples could be suppressed, Indian youth would not act on
this knowledge. The problem with his approach, of course, is that this
history is well known to the communities that have been directly affected, and the refusal of mainstream institutions, legal or educational,
to acknowledge its reality fuels the anger the professor feared.'35 Willful
denial by those controlling the dominant narrative produces anger compounded by frustration and despair, and while such anger may manifest
as the professor fantasized, it is more likely to become self-destructive,
bringing us back to the high rates of depression, alcoholism, and teen suicide referenced in the context of the Columbus Day protests. 3 6 Reflecting on the media's characterizations of Ward Churchill's statements in
the context of a 2005 school shooting on the Red Lake Reservation that
left the teenage shooter, his grandfather, and six others dead, professor
Jodi Byrd of the Chickasaw Nation of Oklahoma concludes:
For the mainstream media, it was ultimately easier to counterpoint Churchill's critique of U.S. domestic and foreign policies
with a simple, superior twist of irony that places responsibility
for atrocities firmly back onto the shoulders of Indians. And
as Indians, we are left to grapple with the psychic [breach]
wrought through centuries of violence within the lands that
the United States now occupies and with the ongoing commit-

ment to survive.137
author).
133 See id. at 3423, lines 5-7. For an excellent analysis of the role played by race and ethnicity
in the University's internal review processes, see Terry Smith, Speaking Against Norms:Public
Discourse and the Economy of Racialization in the Workplace, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 523, 550-57
(2008).
134 See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
13' See, e.g., Resolution, supra note 129.
136See supra notes 35, 73-76 and accompanying text.
1
17Jodi A. Byrd, "Living My Native Life Deadly": Red Lake, Ward Churchill,and the Discourses of Competing Genocides,31 AM. INDIAN Q. 310,329 (2007).
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In Ward Churchill's lawsuit against the University of Colorado, the
judge excluded much relevant history and context, but the jury learned
enough from enough actual experts in American Indian Studies to determine that the University's allegations of research misconduct had been
employed pretextually to fire him in violation of the First Amendment.'38
The trial judge, however, subsequently vacated their verdict by retroactively granting the University absolute immunity for its unconstitutional
conduct.'3 9 The underlying realities of genocidal conduct and the jury's
unanimous verdict in Ward's favor had been placed on the record, but
they would not be allowed to have any legal impact.
In each of the stories I have invoked in this essay, what was excluded
from legal consideration was not simply personal narrative, but the collective histories that form the foundation of our understandings of ourselves as peoples. These histories are consistently suppressed and often,
when exposed, vigorously denied. Thus, for example, Vine Deloria, Jr.,
an American Indian (Nakota) theologian and historian, noted that the
Butler/Robideau defense team obtained a Justice Department memo attributing, in part, the government's failure to obtain convictions in most
of the cases following the 1973 siege at Wounded Knee to the testimony
of two "revisionist historians," Dee Brown and Vine Deloria. According
to Deloria, their testimony, which concerned an 1868 treaty, reflected
"what is already recorded in numerous government documents.... [W]e
were 'revisionists' [only] in the sense that we introduced into the record
materials that had not previously been used to understand that period of

history."1 40
The status quo is maintained not only by excluding underlying realities from legal processes, but also by circumscribing what we teach
about the law. Despite the fact that much documentation is available,
there is very little in the legal literature, and almost nothing taught in
law school, about cases like the ones I have discussed above. Political
prisoners and governmental misconduct are, by and large, taboo subjects. The cases foundational to the ongoing subordination of people of

IsSee Trial Order, Churchill v. University of Colorado, 2009 WL 2704509 (Colo.Dist.Ct.
July 72009). The trial court's ruling was upheld on appeal. See Churchill v. University of Colorado, 285 P.3d 986 (Colo. 2012); cert. denied, 133 S.Ct. 1724 (2013). See also Robert J. Tepper &
Craig G.White, Speak No Evil:Academic Freedom and the Application of Garcetti v. Ceballos
to Public University Faculty, 59 CATH. U. L. REV. 125, 135 n.62 (2009).
13

See generally Deatsch & Boghosian, supra note 128.

140 Vine

Deloria, Jr., Revision and Reversion, in READINGS IN AMERICAN INDIAN LAw: RECALLING THE RHYTHM OF SURVIVAL 146 (Jo CARILLO, ED., 1998).
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color in this country -Dred Scott,141 the Cherokee cases,142 the Insular
cases, 143 the Chinese Exclusion cases1 44 -are taught in snippets, without historical context, and without explanation of how they live on as
precedent for their sanitized contemporary counterparts.145 All of this,
of course, compounds the difficulty of introducing historical or cultural
context into current cases, and further marginalizes the lived realities of
subordinated peoples.
And yet, stories -select stories -continue to shape the law. As Milner Ball notes, "Stories of origin locate law, invest it with legitimacy, and
so lend it stability"146 He explains a critical problem, as he sees it, with
the underlying narrative of American law:
The American legal order debars the autonomy of tribes and
the possibility of dialogue with them as independent centers
of sovereignty. This exclusion cannot be overcome in the received rhetorical manner by telling the story of American origins because that story simply entrenches the exclusion....
The story can be told -and often is -as one in which the tribes
are destroyed.... Told in another fashion, the story may seem
to include Indian voices but is no less insidiously monophonic,
141Dred

Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856). On the broader implications of this decision,

see generally A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., The Ten Precepts ofAmerican Slavery Jurisprudence:
ChiefJustice Roger Taney's Defense and Justice Thurgood Marshall'sCondemnation of the Precept of Black Inferiority,17 Cardozo L. Rev. 1695 (1996).
142Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831);
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 US. 515 (1832). See generally Rennard Strickland & William M.

Strickland, A Tale of Two Marshalls:Reflections on Indian Law and Policy, the Cherokee Cases,
and the CruelIrony of Supreme Court Victories, 47 Okla. L. Rev. 111 (1994).
143Downes

v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901); Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922). See

generally Efr6n Rivera Ramos, The Legal Construction ofAmerican Colonialism:The Insular
Cases (1901-1922), 65 REV. JUR. U. P.R. 225 (1996).
144Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149
U.S. 698 (1893); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896). See generally Louis Henkin,

The Constitution and United States Sovereignty:A Century of Chinese Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853 (1987).
145 I have addressed the ongoing significance of these and related cases in NATSU TAYLOR
SAITO, FROM CHINESE EXCLUSION TO GUANT NAMO BAY: PLENARY POWER AND THE PREROGATIVE
STATE 13-49 (2007). On the continued use of racist precedent, see generally ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., LIKE A LOADED WEAPON: THE REHNQUIST COURT, INDIAN RIGHTS, AND THE LEGAL
HISTORY OF RACISM IN AMERICA (2005).
146 Milner S. Ball, Stories of Origin and Constitutional Possibilities,87 MICH. L. REV. 2280

(1989).
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for the Indians are given voice only as they are assimilated or
made over into acceptable caricatures ...
.1 47
Ball goes on to explain why the American origin story incorporated into

Supreme Court jurisprudence cannot be told in a way that gives American Indians voice.148 The Constitution's Supremacy Clause, he concludes,
is structurally and irredeemably "a great achievement of Americans but
a threat to Native American tribes."149 In other words, indigenous survival is incompatible with certain foundational principles of American
law. This is a legal version of the dilemma posed by the committee member worried about Indian youth engaging in armed struggle. 5 0
When historical realities are acknowledged, we cannot maintain the
pretense that justice can be achieved without fundamental, structural
change. This is a frightening prospect for many. Yet the alternative is to
live in denial about genocidal realities and the fact that peoples threatened with the extermination of their histories, cultures, and identities
will always resist in order to survive. It is, as Professor Montoya said,
impossible to talk about race in this country without talking about genocide. Conversely, if we are not allowed to talk about genocide, we cannot have an honest discussion about race. And if we cannot talk about
either race or genocide, justice through law is an illusion. This is why
Margaret Montoya's work to make our realities a legitimate part of law
and history is so important. M6scaras takes us back to the fundamental
questions about how we conceive the legal enterprise and what it means
to think -or teach -"like a lawyer."' 5' In legal venues as elsewhere, as
Cherokee law professor Rennard Strickland says, "It is time for us to
speak the thing not spoken. It is time to stop pretending."15 2

147
Id. at
14 8

2296.

1 d. at 2300.
14 9
1 d. at 2306.
15o See supra text accompanying note 132.
151 On the historical and institutional factors that have shaped legal education in a manner
that preserves extant relationships of power and privilege, see Daria Roithmayr, Deconstructing the Distinction Between Bias and Merit, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1449, 1475-94 (1997).
152
Rennard Strickland, Things Not Spoken: The Burial of Native American History, Law
and Culture, 13 ST. THOMAs L. REV. 11, 17 (2000).
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